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IntroductIon 
The arts and humanities have no clear identifying criteria 
but most commonly they are thought to comprise 
histories, philosophy, literatures, drama and film, visual 
arts and music. Their methods are imaginative, analytical, 
critical, or investigative, and they provide insight into 
human motivation and relationships as well as enjoyment. 
They can have a bearing on medicine in at least three 
ways.
First, the oldest strand is ‘arts therapy’. Degree courses 
in music therapy, art therapy, and so on, have existed for 
many years. Practitioners emerging from these courses 
see themselves as therapists and have their own ways of 
evaluating their activities. Second, there is the overlapping 
movement known as ‘arts in health’. The artists working 
in this area are not trained as therapists and wish to 
retain their professional identity as artists, writers, 
musicians and so on. They use their skills in hospitals and 
communities to enhance people’s interest, creativity and 
enjoyment of life – which of course affect their health. 
Third, there is the movement involving the arts and 
humanities in medical education. It is unfortunate that 
the term ‘medical humanities’ has come to be used as an 
umbrella term for all three movements. Indeed, as I shall 
suggest in the final section of this paper, it is unfortunate 
that the term has arisen at all, although I shall continue 
to use it. It is with the role of the arts and humanities in 
medical education that I shall be concerned, although the 
other areas are also important, inexpensive and 
successful. 
Early hIstory 
In any new movement the question of ‘who got there 
first’ is always contentious, but a case can be made (I 
shall not insist on it) that the use of the humanities in 
medical education emerged out of the teaching of 
medical ethics in Glasgow University in the late 1980s. I 
was fortunate in being allowed to take part in joint 
teaching on ethics with Sir Kenneth Calman, who was 
then Postgraduate Dean at Glasgow University. Our 
discussions with students involved analysis and criticism 
of medical practice and human motivation. We found 
that students were more interested in the details of 
cases than general principles. Their interest led us to set 
up an after-hours club for discussion of these matters 
through literature, film, etc; these meetings were well-
attended by students and consultants alike. Encouraged 
by this I organised five annual conferences in the early 
1990s and anthologised material for discussion.1 More 
importantly, in 1993 the General Medical Council 
changed the undergraduate curriculum making room for 
what were then called Special Study Modules: five weeks 
of intensive study of anything a medical school could 
offer.2 There was encouragement for involving the 
humanities in some Special Study Modules. Funding 
bodies such as Nuffield and Wellcome became interested 
and national conferences developed. The present 
outcome is that many medical schools in the UK and 
elsewhere offer options in the medical humanities. 
If the humanities are to be allowed into the curriculum 
it is reasonable to review what they can contribute to 
medical education or clinical practice. First, they can 
contribute to topics currently in the curriculum, such as 
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ethics and communication. I shall call this the 
supplementary function of the humanities. Second, the 
humanities are able to offer detached, third-party 
scrutiny, a way of putting medical practice into a wider 
perspective. I shall call this the critical function. Third, the 
humanities can make a contribution to the personal and 
professional development of at least some medical 
practitioners. Despite these positive contributions I shall 
suggest that the medical humanities face some serious 
problems. 
thE supplEmEntary functIon of thE 
humanItIEs 
In this section I shall be concerned with ethics, 
communication and the connections between them. The 
Hippocratic tradition in ethics has of course been 
re-stated in updated versions such as the Declaration of 
Geneva, adopted as the Code of the World Medical 
Association (1968). In recent times codes have been 
made more specific by medical law and the quasi-law 
issuing from the General Medical Council in the UK and 
similar bodies elsewhere. Ethical regulation is of central 
importance for a clinician but it by no means covers 
everything of relevance because what it offers is medical 
ethics, or ethics from a medical point of view. But ‘ethics’ 
is just a professional name for ordinary right and wrong, 
and right and wrong, good and bad, extend well beyond 
the boundaries of medicine. 
An influential attempt to connect the ethical problems 
of medicine with the broader sphere of morality was 
made in a book entitled The Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.3 They 
argued that ethical problems in medicine can be resolved 
by the use of four principles from ordinary morality: 
non-maleficence (don’t harm), beneficence (do some 
good), autonomy (respect the patient’s decisions) and 
justice (treat patients fairly). Their book has exerted a 
dominant influence on the teaching of ethics to medical 
students for generations. But there are problems about 
how to use the four principles. An influential supporter 
of the approach, Raanon Gillon, argues that the four 
principles offer a vocabulary for discussing moral 
problems in medicine.4 Perhaps they do, but there is no 
reason to impoverish our discussions by restricting 
moral concepts to just four. For example, sometimes a 
doctor may need to stand up to a manager, or an angry 
relative. Qualities such as courage, equanimity, tact, 
honesty or patience may be needed – even humility 
when things go wrong. The general point is that hospitals 
or general practices are microcosms of society as a 
whole – with heightened tensions – and it is therefore 
necessary to have the entire range of moral concepts to 
understand their problems.5 This is where novels, short 
stories, plays and films are helpful. They can provide 
condensed versions of the problems of life and confront 
us with the question: What would you have done? 
Stories can sharpen judgement.
In any case there is more to morality than principles and 
concepts; morality has what we might term its adverbial 
aspect. It matters not just what we do but how and 
when. In this context it is sometimes said that what is 
needed is compassion or empathy, and there are many 
advocates for the teaching of such matters in medical 
training.6 But the limitations of compassion or empathy 
are satirised in a poem entitled Animal Rights by Miroslav 
Holub, a distinguished Czech doctor who was one of the 
best poets writing in Europe in the second half of the 
20th century.7 This abbreviated version gives the flavour 
of it:
Animal Rights
Pity for dogs that cry
(boundless pity).
Pity for mice that squirm.
Pity for earthworms that wither helplessly
(limited pity).
 ………
Patients with progressive amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
can just fuck off. They shouldn’t have been born.
Hieronymous Bosch be with them
for ever and ever amen.
This poem can produce animated discussion! The 
conclusion we usually reached is that doctors, who will 
be faced with blood, sweat, tears and worse, should try 
to have a controlled, measured and calm response to 
ailments of all kinds - too much emotion will get in the 
way of the job. What is needed is quiet waiting and 
listening, giving concentrated attention to the patient.
At this point some medical educators will say: ‘We know 
this, and it is taught in courses on communication and 
listening skills.’ There is indeed a vast literature on 
communication skills. The assumption is that there are 
generalisable skills that are teachable and learnable and 
therefore widely applicable. Perhaps there are but their 
universal applicability is unlikely to extend much beyond 
such matters as avoiding technical terms, not speaking 
too quickly, and repeating the message. These things are 
of course of the first importance, but the attempt to have 
a complete reduction of communication to a set of 
discrete skills is bound to fail. Patients and their problems, 
doctors and their personalities, are too varied for any 
reductionist approach to communication to be entirely 
successful. Good communication is not a manipulative 
technique but is inherently creative.8 This is where the 
arts and humanities, especially creative writing or drama 
or film, can be of help. The arts can bring out the myriad 
ways in which people can successfully and unsuccessfully 
communicate with each other.
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They can also illustrate how a human response to a 
patient is compatible with a technical concern. Paintings 
can be good examples of this. There is a painting called 
‘The Doctor’ by Sir Luke Fildes which hangs in the Tate 
Gallery.9 It presents an eloquent portrayal of what (as it 
seems to me) medicine is all about; the doctor, the 
patient (a sick child), the parents anxious in the 
background, and the quality of the relationship between 
them all. The emotional impact of the painting is 
enhanced by noting some of the technical details, e.g. the 
angle of the doctor’s back, the space between his eyes 
and the sick child, the highlighting of the child in bed. An 
appreciation of technical detail in art or music can enrich 
emotional impact. The psychiatrist Jonathan Green 
argues that works of art ‘carry their cultural power by 
being ways of embodying states of mind’ and that 
‘inferring mental states is not only a core psychiatric skill 
but also one we exercise in looking at art’. In a telling 
image he says: ‘The painting sucks in attention to itself ’.10 
He is speaking of psychiatry but what he says is surely 
true of medicine more generally. Technical awareness 
and human response can enhance each other and can 
produce a unique mode of attention.11 Fine art and 
music can bring this out.
thE crItIcal functIon
The origins of modern scientific medicine are to be 
found in the school of Hippocrates (around 460 BC). 
The central doctrine of the Hippocratic School is that 
every disease has a cause which can be discovered and 
is curable, and that this knowledge is generalisable. His 
scientific approach ignores the individuality of patients 
and concentrates on what diseases have in common. For 
example, Hippocrates writes: ‘Every phenomenon will be 
found to have some cause’ or ‘Each disease has a natural 
cause and nothing happens without a natural cause’.12 
Medicine has been profoundly influenced by this tradition, 
to the extent that it is sometimes seen as an applied 
science. As an example of the critical function of the 
humanities I shall examine this position. 
It can be claimed that science is relevant to medicine in 
four different ways. First, from the Greeks to the present 
day there have been investigations into the normal and 
pathological workings of the body, carried out by 
sciences such as anatomy, physiology and biochemistry. 
Second, there are observational studies which report 
such matters as changes in birthweight over a period. 
Third, there are qualitative studies which might be 
concerned, for example, with the interaction between 
doctors and patients. Finally, there are randomised 
clinical trials. Are these different sorts of research 
equally scientific?
The subjects in the first group – anatomy, physiology, 
biochemistry – are clearly sciences. They satisfy the usual 
criteria for science in that they are observational, 
reductionist to the factors being researched, and 
experimental. Their results are quantifiable, generalisable, 
and frequently offer causal explanations. They are 
therefore objective in the sense of being independent of 
personal bias. The second category is more doubtfully 
scientific. Observational studies may record quantitative 
changes but such studies belong more to the category 
of natural history than to science. This of course is in no 
way to denigrate their importance: facts must be known 
before causal explanations are attempted. Regarding the 
third category, qualitative studies are even more 
doubtfully scientific, being based very much on the 
interpretation and value judgments of the observing 
researcher. They are certainly observational but attempts 
to generalise them by making the qualitative quantitative 
will actually reduce their value. If something is quantitative, 
or measurable, there must obviously be factors to be 
measured. But in measuring, say, ‘patient-centredness’ the 
factors selected for measuring, such as the making of 
eye-contact or the angle of the chair, are quite arbitrary. 
Some patients do not want to be looked at. The 
reductionism necessary for quantification makes such 
studies misleading. The fourth sort of research, 
randomised trials, is regarded as the ‘gold-standard’ of 
medical research and is the kind of research most often 
reported in the press. But is this the ‘gold-standard’ of 
science? Are randomised trials observational, 
reductionist, experimental, quantifiable, generalisable and 
objective or independent of personal bias? 
They are certainly observational and quantifiable, and 
they are reductionist in that they set out to test discrete 
factors, such as the efficacy of a given drug. But they 
cannot fully satisfy the generalisability criterion in that 
they are concerned only with statistical probabilities. 
Moreover, there may sometimes be questions about 
how the volunteers for the trials are chosen, how the 
trials are financed and how their results are evaluated 
and promoted. In other words, there may be doubts 
raised about the objectivity criterion. More importantly 
they have two other limitations: one affecting their 
credentials as science and the other their position in 
clinical practice. 
It could be argued that, even if we ignore their possible 
failings in objectivity and generalisability, randomised 
trials do not contribute to the primary purpose of 
science, which is to offer an understanding of nature. 
Scientific understanding is usually provided by causal 
explanations or theoretical models or by providing the 
connecting principles of nature. If science is seen in this 
way, randomised trials are really natural history rather 
than science in the full sense. Of course, there are other 
views of science. For example, the 17th century 
philosopher Francis Bacon expresses an alternative view 
when he says that: ‘Truth and utility are here the very 
same thing’.13 Without going as far as that the aim of 
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funding bodies generally is to promote what they regard 
as useful knowledge. Perhaps, then, it does not matter 
whether randomised trials are truly scientific provided 
they produce useful knowledge. But, secondly, there are 
limitations to that useful knowledge in clinical practice: 
limitations which stem from their statistical nature. It 
does not follow from the fact that a drug has been 
efficacious in 65% of cases that it will be efficacious with 
a given patient. Indeed, it might be harmful, or the 
patient, upon being told the side-effects, might refuse 
consent. In other words, randomised trials are not the 
be-all-and-end-all of clinical medicine. Clinical medicine 
claims to be ‘evidence-based’, but the evidence of 
randomised trials compares unfavourably with that of 
laboratory science or that of a court of law.
In concluding this aspect of the critical function of the 
humanities I must stress two points. First, the material is 
offered only by way of a very brief illustration of what a 
humanity such as philosophy can provide for discussion. 
Jane Macnaughton and I have developed the argument in 
detail elsewhere.14 Many readers may wish to disagree 
with some or all of it, but in disagreeing they will 
themselves be engaged in the philosophical enterprise. 
Second, criticisms of the kind outlined can arise within 
medicine itself. A philosophical critique of some aspects 
of medical practice is not exclusive to professional 
philosophers.
Medical history also can offer a critique of what is 
considered the ‘gold standard’ of research in the sense 
that it can offer a wider historical perspective on 
research. For example, Sir James Mackenzie, working as 
a GP in the first half of the 20th century, regarded 
general practice as the proper place for clinical research. 
He carried out pioneering work in cardiology in Burnley, 
London and in the St Andrews Institute for Clinical 
Research. A study of his work – its successes and failures 
– can suggest new ways of looking at medical research.15
 
Drama can also place the narrow focus of medicine in a 
wider perspective. In Ibsen’s play An Enemy of the People, 
Dr Stockman is first depicted as immensely popular and 
his report on the water contamination of proposed 
baths is acclaimed as scientifically accurate. But many 
other considerations emerge, involving tourism, jobs and 
so on, and he finishes up an ‘enemy of the people’. The 
main point is well-made by the play’s newspaper editor: 
‘You’re a doctor and a man of science, and to you this 
business of the water is to be considered in isolation. I 
think you don’t perhaps realise how far it’s tied up with 
a lot of other things.’16 The humanities, or some of them, 
can bring out sharply how medical issues, such as public 
health, are tied in with ‘a lot of other things’. 
Doctors have a high status in society and are highly 
respected for the work they do. It is therefore not 
surprising that occasionally some doctors are seen as 
pompous and self-important. But literature can provide 
an antidote, can hold up a mirror for self-reflection. It is 
true that some doctors in literature come out well, such 
as the doctor in Macbeth who sees limits to what 
medicine can do,17 or Dr Lydgate in George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch. Eliot is ‘…the first English novelist to 
delineate with historical precision the emergence of a 
new kind of doctor’, one who is devoted both to 
research and to his patients.18 But there is also a long 
tradition which depicts doctors in a satirical way, as 
figures of fun, for example the Doctour of Physique in 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales.19 In opera doctors hardly 
ever come out well.20 Most shaming of all, the demigod 
of medicine, Asclepius, came to a bad end. There are 
various accounts of him, but he over-stepped the mark 
when a patient, whom Zeus had decreed should die, was 
brought back from death by Asclepius. According to the 
Greek poet Pindar ‘Gold glittered in his hand’ (same old 
story) and Zeus destroyed both with a thunderbolt.21 
The myth does not make it clear whether Zeus was 
annoyed at the introduction of private medicine, or 
whether it was a punishment for hubris – the attempt by 
Asclepius to continue life beyond its ordained length. 
Either way the myth can produce good discussion about 
the limits, if any, to what medicine should attempt. The 
humanities can offer a gentler and perhaps more 
effective critique of the medicalisation of life than the 
‘in-your-face’ arguments of, say, Ivan Illich.22
pErsonal and profEssIonal 
dEvElopmEnt
It could be argued that professional development is a 
matter of attending courses to update medical knowledge 
and skills, whereas personal development is a matter for 
the private life of a doctor and is of no concern to 
medical educators. In some spheres, such as accountancy 
or plumbing, it may be correct that there is no continuity 
between professional or public and private life. But this 
is not the case in clinical medicine. Patients can easily tell 
whether they are dealing with a genuinely concerned 
and educated doctor or someone who has been on a 
training course and has learned what the compassionate 
doctor is meant to do or say. John Stuart Mill puts the 
point well when he writes: ‘It is important not only what 
men do, but also what manner of men they are that do 
it.’23 Indeed, it can be argued that personal development 
is a moral duty. Morality is often considered as a matter 
of checks and balances, ensuring our duties to others. 
But this is a recent view. Historically speaking, many 
accounts of the nature of morality give a large role to 
becoming a particular type of person. The Greeks for 
instance stress this. Even Kant’s maxim of respect for 
persons as ends is rarely quoted in full, in which he says 
’Respect human nature, whether in your own person or 
in that of another’.24 In other words, he is stressing that 
we have duties to ourselves, to develop our own human 
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natures. The personal development of the doctor 
matters both for him/herself and for patients and also, as 
I shall suggest, for life outside medicine and in retirement.
Personal development can be furthered by the arts but 
it should be noted that it can also be furthered by an 
interest in pure science. Science as taught in medical 
training necessarily has goals internal to medicine, but 
pure science has goals internal to itself – as a way of 
understanding the universe and its creatures. In that way 
it is educative. As simple illustrations of science depicted 
as a broadening or educative pursuit I point to the 
television programmes of Sir David Attenborough, 
Professor Brian Cox or Professor Jim Al-Khalili. If asked, 
‘What use is your science?’ they would be puzzled 
(although no doubt they would think quickly if a grant 
application were involved!). What shines through their 
presentations is their belief that the sciences they 
enthusiastically explain and expound are among the 
glories of the human mind. It is also worth issuing the 
warning that the humanities themselves are not 
necessarily humanistic or educative. For example, a 
historian of the French Revolution if asked what it taught 
about social equality or democracy might well reply, ‘I am 
not interested in that kind of question. I am just 
interested in the documents and facts’.25 A historian with 
that approach is trained rather than educated. The sad 
truth is that many arts subjects have become infested 
with jargon and are inward-looking, and consequently fail 
in their basic humanising function. 
Nevertheless, the arts can make a contribution to 
personal development and via that to professional 
development. Their contribution can be stated 
controversially: they provide an antidote to medical 
training and the whole ethos of medicine. There are two 
aspects to this, one specific and one more general.
 
The more specific contribution which the arts can make 
to personal and professional development is best 
expressed by the term introduced by Edward de Bono 
– a former lecturer in medicine at Oxford University - 
‘lateral thinking’.26 His main point is that we tend to see 
the world in terms of certain patterns or groupings. The 
person with a disposition to lateral thinking is the 
person who can break away from familiar patterns and 
discover new ways of looking at things. Intellectually, 
lateral thinking may emerge as a sceptical disposition 
towards received opinion and routine. There is a fair 
amount of both in medical training and practice, but the 
arts can sometimes suggest alternative ways of 
approaching problems. More generally, many doctors see 
medical solutions to all the problems of life, and have 
encouraged the public and governments to do likewise. 
Thus, mental illness, disability and drug addiction are 
usually understood by doctors and the public as medical 
problems when in fact there may be other approaches 
to them. Perhaps organising festivals, pageants and 
firework displays may improve the health in a deprived 
area more than funding another GP. It has been said that 
if your only tool is a hammer all your problems become 
nails.27 A doctor who can look beyond his prescription 
pad might be able to suggest other remedies. For 
example, singing has been shown to lead to improvements 
in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and to the 
enhancing of mental health and wellbeing.28
Moving to the more general aspect of an arts contribution 
to medicine we can note that the most noticeable 
feature of medical training and practice is that it is highly 
focused and clearly useful to society. Every code of 
ethics stresses that the doctor must above all provide a 
service to others, and every aspect of medical training is 
practical and goal-directed. One consequence is that 
medicine tends to colonise the whole personality of 
doctors. There is said to be a tombstone which bears 
the inscription: ‘Here lies John Smith who was born a 
man and died a grocer’. Whatever can be said about 
grocers there is a moral here which doctors should 
consider. The demanding and prolonged nature of 
medical training coupled with the tiring and often 
emotionally draining nature of patient care may leave 
time for little else, resulting in the diminishing of a 
doctor’s personality. This is where the arts and humanities 
can offer a remedy. 
 
The nature of the remedy emerges when I admit that 
many practitioners of the arts and humanities would be 
uncomfortable with my attempt in this paper to suggest 
how they may be useful in medical education. For them 
the arts and humanities are simply worthwhile for their 
own sake. One of Aristotle’s criteria for the highest good 
is that it must be completely useless.29 This sounds comic 
to modern ears. But Aristotle is surely right. Whatever is 
useful is useful for a given end, which itself may become 
a means to a further end. Hence, there will be a never-
ending chain of means and ends unless we find activities 
which are worth pursuing just for their own sake. The 
arts and humanities can be included with pure science 
among these worthwhile activities. Simply by being 
worthwhile for their own sake, the arts and humanities 
can broaden the outlook and enrich the personality of a 
doctor. This is important throughout a career but also in 
retirement. Having retired from an absorbing career, 
many doctors think: what now? Seeds sown in medical 
education may finally mature and new interests can 
develop.
somE proBlEms
The medical humanities are currently faced with at least 
three types of problem: of administration, of content and 
of dominant aim. Administratively it is not easy to find 
appropriate teachers. Ideally, medical students who have 
chosen an area of the humanities of interest to them 
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should take part in the relevant humanities classes. But 
this is difficult to timetable. Another good solution is 
joint teaching by someone from the humanities and 
someone from the medical school. Again, there are 
problems of finding colleagues willing to co-operate. 
Commonly, a volunteer may be someone from the 
humanities with an interest in making his/her subject 
interesting to medical students, or someone from the 
medical school with an interest in a humanity. Some 
universities are training specialists in the medical 
humanities, but there is not likely to be funding to 
employ them in medical schools, and they may have 
credibility problems with students. Moreover, however 
they are taught, the humanities in medical education 
have problems concerning levels of attainment and 
methods of assessment.30
In terms of their content, the medical humanities are 
often identified with literature. But many other 
humanities are equally of interest to students and, as I 
have tried to show, of relevance to medical education. 
One consequence of this narrowing of the medical 
humanities to literature has been an obsession with 
certain words, especially ‘narrative’. The word has 
become to the humanities movement what ‘evidence-
based medicine’ is to clinicians; a term which encapsulates 
important truths but is now obscuring other factors of 
clinical relevance. The importance of the word ‘narrative’ 
lies in its stress on listening to patients’ accounts of what 
they think has gone wrong. The term has arisen as part 
of an attempt to move clinical attention away from an 
exclusive concentration on laboratory tests and other 
measurements and to redirect it to the patient. Clinicians 
of course have always listened to the patient’s story. It 
was called ‘taking a case history’ and one of the relevant 
skills is surely being able to ask the questions which elicit 
helpful information. In a sense then an emphasis on 
‘narrative’ is simply an attempt to alter the clinical 
balance in that direction, to make the patient feel part of 
the treatment rather than just an object of scientific 
interest. While this is admirable it hardly warrants the 
extensive literature devoted to the analysis of the term 
‘narrative’.31 In any case, in contemporary healthcare 
there is not enough time to listen to anything so grand 
as a ‘narrative’. 
The dominant aim of the medical humanities seems now 
to be research rather than teaching. I commented at the 
start that the introduction of the term ‘medical 
humanities’ has been unfortunate. The reason is that it 
has suggested that the ‘medical humanities’ comprise an 
academic subject. Now if something is to be an academic 
subject there must be research, and funding bodies such 
as Wellcome have given millions of pounds for research 
into this alleged subject. But the more ‘academic’ the 
practitioners of the medical humanities become the 
more they will drift away from their original educational 
purpose. The danger is that researchers in the medical 
humanities will finish up speaking only to similar 
researchers rather than to the medical students and 
clinicians we originally hoped to interest.32
conclusIon
An excellent description of the educational role we 
originally envisaged is captured in the name of the centre 
in Durham, set up by Sir Kenneth Calman. It was called 
the Centre for the Arts and Humanities in Health and 
Medicine (CAHHM). This acronym brings out that there 
are many arts and humanities, and they may contribute 
in different practical ways to different areas of medicine. 
They can offer historical or philosophical perspectives 
and suggest new or alternative approaches to existing 
courses. Above all they can encourage creative thinking 
and a humane and balanced approach to patients. It will 
be unfortunate if this outward-looking aim is turned into 
an inward-looking purely academic activity. 
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